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In a variety of contexts, cultural minorities1 have cause to fear
adjudication of their legal rights and responsibilities in a legal system
dominated by majority-culture personnel (most notably including
judges and jurors). This is particularly true when cultural minorities
attempt to use formal legal processes to give effect to choices which
are inconsistent with prevailing community norms. In such cases, the
substantive merit of their legal claims is at risk of being subjugated to
majoritarian values, through a process that relies on members of the
majority culture to vindicate the substantive rights at issue.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. A.B.,
1987, Cornell University; J.D., 1991, Duke University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge
the assistance of Gregory Alexander, Mary Louise Fellows, Eleanor Kinney, Ron Krotoszynski,
Florence Wagman Roisman, June Starr and Betsy Wilborn Malloy. I also thank Emory Law
School for hosting me during the summer of 1998 as I finished work on this Article.
1 For the purposes of this Article, I define "culture" as a set of shared values and beliefs.
I define a "cultural minority" member as an individual whose core religious, political or social
values and beliefs differ meaningfully and substantially from majoritarian norms.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
This phenomenon presents a cruel dilemma: cultural minorities
must either forego the formal enforcement of their legal rights or trust
enforcement of their rights to a culturally-biased forum. This Article
proposes a solution to this Catch-22, at least insofar as testamentary
freedom is concerned.
Our society is committed in principle to the ideal of testamentary
freedom. In practice, however, the law disfavors testamentary dispo-
sitions that deviate from the norm; it prefers gifts to the testator's le-
gal spouse and close blood relations over gifts to other potential bene-
ficiaries. Thus, for example, the matriarch who disinherits her chil-
dren in favor of the guru who gave her spiritual comfort in her de-
clining years faces a greater likelihood that her estate plan will be in-
validated by a trier of fact whose sense of propriety is offended by the
gift.
2
Using the "abhorrent" testator as the focal point for an explora-
tion of the larger problem of systemic bias, this Article considers tes-
tator-compelled arbitration as a means for overcoming the trier of
fact's propensity to invalidate any estate plan that does not conform to
majoritarian cultural norms. Part I of this Article identifies the prob-
lem and explores how the trier of fact in a will contest, wittingly or
unwittingly, may use legal doctrines intended to safeguard testamen-
tary freedom to undermine the testamentary freedom of the noncon-
forming testator. For example, the doctrines of mental capacity, un-
due influence and testamentary fraud incorporate a rational bias in
favor of the testator's legal spouse and close blood relations. This
bias, sensible though it may be, imperils any estate plan that disfavors
the testator's legal spouse or close blood relations in favor of non-
family beneficiaries. These doctrines also are sufficiently ambiguous
that they provide cover for a trier of fact that wishes to reorder an es-
tate plan to conform to her own values. The trier of fact might wish
to do so, particularly if the values reflected in the testator's estate plan
offend her sensibilities.
Part II of this Article suggests a means for alleviating this threat
to the nonconforming testator's estate plan. Since the threat arises
from distinctions between the testator's culture and those of the trier
of fact, the proposed solution focuses on cultural understanding. Part
II recommends that the nonconforming testator direct in her will that
2 See Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502,508 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that the finding that a non-mainstream spiritual leader unduly influenced testator to
disinherit her minor son and execute a will favoring the spiritual leader was supported by the
evidence).
3 For ease of discussion, I use the term "family" in this Article to mean one's legal
spouse and close blood relations. Some people, of course, have come to define their "family"
more broadly. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Associates, Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989)
(extending the definition of "family" to include those persons whose relationship with each
other possesses "all of the normal familial characteristics").
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any contest concerning the will shall be adjudicated by an arbitrator
appointed by the testator. Thus, the testator will be able to select a
decision-maker who is familiar with and respectful of the values that
informed the drafting of her estate plan.
Lastly, Part III of this Article considers and rejects several ob-
jections to testator-compelled arbitration. First, testator-compelled
arbitration conflicts with the archetype of arbitration-a dispute
resolution mechanism to which all parties to the dispute voluntarily
assent. Part I argues, however, that the testator's right to compel
arbitration of any challenge to her estate plan derives from the hierar-
chy of rights at issue. The testator's right to devise her property as she
wishes supersedes any claim that her heirs or putative legatees may
assert to succeed to that property.
Second, it may be argued that an arbitrator's authority to adjudi-
cate a will contest may not arise from the very instrument that the will
contestant alleges is invalid. The doctrine of separability, however,
dictates that the testator may invest the arbitrator with authority to
decide all challenges to her will, save those that allege specifically the
invalidity of the will's arbitration clause.
Finally, the impartiality of the testator's appointed arbitrator may
be questioned. Arguably, such a party-appointed arbitrator is pre-
sumptively biased in favor of the testator and, thus, presumptively
unfit to adjudicate a challenge to the testator's estate plan. Part III
concludes that public policy should preclude adjudication before an
arbitrator whose interests are disproportionately aligned with those of
the testator so that the arbitration is unlikely to provide a meaningful
opportunity for the will contestant to prevail on the merits. Such a
principle, however, should not be a per se bar to adjudication before
an arbitrator who shares a common minority culture with the testator.
Part Ill also proposes an alternative arbitration scheme-arbitration
before a tripartite body composed of one arbitrator selected by the
testator, a second arbitrator selected by the will contestant and a third
arbitrator selected by the two party-appointed arbitrators-that incor-
porates off-setting biases and, thus, should be above any reproach on
grounds of arbitrator bias. In sum, the Article concludes that arbitra-
tion presents a viable solution to the problem of cultural bias in tradi-
tional legal forums, at least in the context of will contests.
1999]
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I. THE FREEDOM TO CONFoRM
The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.4
Freedom of testation encompasses the right to pass one's property at
death to the persons or institutions of one's choosing.5 It is widely
accepted that testamentary freedom furthers important social policies.
Testamentary freedom provides an incentive for property owners to
remain economically engaged, to make their capital productive and to
preserve, rather than consume, their assets. Testamentary freedom
also contributes to the stability of the family by providing a financial
incentive, if one is needed, for children and more distant relations to
care for their physically declining (and soon-to-be-devising) family
6
members. Therefore, while the law of testation does expressly place
a few restrictions on testamentary freedom, 7 "virtually the entire law
of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose
of his property as he pleases in death as in life."
8
In furtherance of this ideal, to ensure that the state may discern
the testator's dispositive wishes after her death, the law of wills sets
forth certain formalities for the execution of a will.9 Although the
details of these formalities vary from state to state, in general, every
state requires that a will be in writing, be signed by the testator and be
attested to by competent witnesses.
Moreover, to ensure that the testator's purported will truly repre-
sents her dispositive preferences, the law prescribes that the testator
must possess testamentary capacity and be free from undue influence
and fraud at the time she executes her will. The test for testamentary
capacity is not demanding: the testator must only be capable of under-
4 See, e.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting From Meretricious Re-
lationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200, 200
(1989) ("[R]estrictions on the freedom of testation are usually considered anathema both to
private property rights and to the rights of the individual."); John H. Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Sub-
stantial Compliance] ("The first principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation.").
5 More broadly, freedom of testation also includes the right to pass one's property at
death in the form of one's choosing and to appoint to another the right to make each of these
decisions. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 6 (2d ed. 1997).
6 See generally Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 100-
21 (1990) (discussing the justifications commonly asserted in favor of testamentary freedom and
arguing that such justifications are overstated).
7 Taxation of the decedent's estate and restrictions in favor of granting the surviving
spouse a share of the decedent's estate are among the most significant restrictions that the state
places on a property owner's right to pass her property at death. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-
201 to 2-214 (1993) (granting to a surviving spouse the right to take an elective share percent-
age of the decedent's estate).
8 Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 4, at 491.
9 See id. ("The many rules governing testamentary capacity and the construction of wills
are directed to two broad issues of testamentary intent: did the decedent intend to make a will,
and if so what are its terms?").
'




standing (1) what she owns, (2) which persons are the natural objects
of her bounty, (3) the estate plan that she is drafting and (4) how these
first three elements relate to each other." The test for undue influ-
ence is easily stated although it is not so easily applied: "A will is in-
valid if it is obtained through an influence which destroys the free
agency of the testator and substitutes another's volition for his. Influ-
ence may be undue although it does not amount to physical coercion,
but mere advice, persuasion or kindness does not constitute undue
influence."'12 Finally, testamentary fraud has five elements: (1) a mis-
representation told (2) with the intent to deceive the testator and (3)
with the intent to influence thewill, which misrepresentation (4) does
deceive the testator and (5) does influence the will.' 3
These express standards for guarding testamentary freedom, in
practice, incorporate an implicit societal norm favoring donative
transfers to legal spouses and close blood relations over other donees.
This norm favoring family furthers donative freedom on the whole in
that it appropriately reflects the wishes of the average testator.14 As
Professor Mary Louise Fellows explains:
The nature of the distribution plan is probably the most
critical observable fact influencing the outcomes of cases in
which capacity, undue influence, or fraud are at issue. The
public policy concern for the financial security and fair
treatment of spouses and children, and the belief that most
property owners probably intend to provide for their
spouses and lineal descendants, create a presumption in fa-
vor of the family. In other words, absent contrary evidence,
courts impute to a property owner the intent to provide for
the family in a manner that favors the spouse over other
relatives, favors blood relatives over institutions and unre-
lated friends, and treats children equally.
15
"See THOMASE. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OFWILLS 232 (2d ed. 1953).
'
21d. at 255.
3See id. at 265-67.
14See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 613-14,
621-22 (1988) [hereinafter Fellows, Donative Intent].
15 14 at 621-22 (footnotes ommitted). In many jurisdictions, a confidential relationship
between the testator and the beneficiary may give rise to a presumption of undue influence. See
MCGOVERN Er AL, supra note 10, at 279; Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Free-
dom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 253 (1996); see also deFuria, supra note 4, at 202 (arguing that "it
makes far more sense to view testamentary gifts based upon meretricious relationships as evi-
dence of the natural beneficence of the testator, rather than as evidence of undue influence"). A
confidential relationship generally is characterized by particular closeness or dependence. See
McGOVERN ET AL, supra note 10, at 280. It is surprising, therefore, that courts are far less
likely to find that a confidential relationship existed between the testator and her legal spouse as
compared to a relationship between the testator and a non-spouse. See Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 230 (1981) ("[Clourts
often assert that a wife is allowed greater freedom than others in urging the testator to make a
2791999]
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Thus, all things being equal, a testamentary disposition favoring
family is more likely to survive a capacity, undue influence or fraud
challenge than is a disposition favoring non-family. 16 In this way, the
very standards aimed at ensuring testamentary freedom risk the tes-
tamentary freedom of a nontraditional testator who willingly executes
an estate plan that fails to conform to societal norms, namely those
preferring the legal spouse and close blood relations to all other po-
tential beneficiaries.'
Intestacy statutes exacerbate this danger to the nonconforming
testator. Every state has an intestacy statute that provides a scheme
for distributing an owner's property at her death in the absence of
valid arrangements made by the property owner during her life.
18
Such arrangements typically include a will and/or will substitutes
such as a joint tenancy or an inter vivos trust.19
Intestacy statutes are intended to distribute a decedent's intestate
property according to the preferences of the average intestate per-
son.20 Thus, the typical intestacy statute calls for distribution of the
decedent's intestate property to the decedent's spouse and issue or, if
the decedent left no issue, to the decedent's spouse and parents.2 If
the decedent left neither a spouse nor issue, most intestacy statutes
give the decedent's intestate property to her parents and/or siblings or,
will in accordance with her wishes-that conduct which would amount to undue influence in the
case of someone other than a spouse is permissible in the case of a spouse."); see also
McGOVERN ET AL, supra note 10, at 280 ("Courts rarely find that a confidential relationship
exists between spouses."); Leslie, supra, at 253 ("[C]ourts are much more likely to find a confi-
dential relationship where the testator's will disinherits relatives in favor of non-relatives, and
the non-relative cannot offer an explanation for the bequest that satisfies the court"). Thus,
application of the rule that a "confidential relationship" should give rise to a presumption of
undue influence makes it easier to challenge the will of a testator who leaves her estate to her
non-marital significant other than it is to challenge the will of a testator who leaves her estate to
her legal spouse. See Sherman, supra, at 231; see also Emily Berendt & Laura L. Michaels,
Your HIV Client: Easing the Burden on the Family Through Estate Planning, 24 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 509, 520 (1991) ("[H]eterosexual spouses are expected to have a strong influence on
each other, while the influence between homosexual spouses is considered unnatural and un-
due.").
16See Fellows, Donative Intent, supra note 14, at 622 ("Although courts acknowledge
that they should not interfere with an estate plan solely because it is a product of nontraditional
norms and lifestyles, they nevertheless require a substantial showing why the presumption in
favor of a traditional distribution to the family is inapposite") (footnote omitted).
17See id. at 613 ("Undoubtedly, the state's preference for family places at risk nontradi-
tional distribution schemes that exclude some family members in favor of other family or non-
family members.").
'
8See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to 2-105 (1993).
19 0f course, it is possible for one to arrange, during one's lifetime, for distribution at
death of some but not all of one's estate and, thus, to die partially intestate.
2°See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 10 at 19; see also Mary Louise Fellows et al.,
Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 8 (1998) (as-
serting that intestacy statutes reflect a commitment to donative freedom but also protect family
members' reliance interests and promote and encourage the nuclear family.)2 tSee, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 to 2-103 (1993).
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if the decedent also left no parents or siblings, to more distant blood
relatives of the decedent."'
The express preference for a legal spouse and blood relations in-
corporated into intestacy statutes works in conjunction with the im-
plicit societal norm favoring such relations incorporated into testa-
mentary freedom standards to disrupt the nonconforming estate plan.
Thus, once a nonconforming will is successfully challenged on
grounds such as testamentary fraud, inadequate mental capacity or
undue influence, the testator's probate estate will be distributed ac-
cording to the state's intestacy provisions, which the legislature
drafted in accordance with those same majoritarian norms favoring a
legal spouse and close blood relations.
Commentators have widely hypothesized that there is a second
way in which the standards for testamentary freedom jeopardize the
testamentary freedom of a nonconforming testator. If the noncon-
forming disposition (or the explanation given for it) offends the trier
of fact's sense of equity or propriety, the fact-finder might choose to
use these standards to discard the estate plan of the testator in favor of
an intestacy scheme that conforms more closely to the fact-finder's
own cultural norms.23 In this way, a contest challenging the validity
of a nonconforming estate plan becomes a conflict of deeply held val-
ues. 24 Our society highly values testamentary freedom but is reluctant
to endorse personal relationships that deviate meaningfully from the
22See, e.g., id. At § 2-103; McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 10, at 13. Presently, only Ha-
waii allows for intestate inheritance rights to a decedent's same-sex partner. See RAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (Michie Supp. 1997). Hawaii provides for an intestate distribution
to and an elective share right in "reciprocal beneficiaries" which the relevant statute defines as
"two adults who are parties to a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship and meet the requisites
for a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship." HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-3. These re-
quirements include that the parties consent to the relationship and (1) be at least eighteen years
of age, (2) be unmarried and not a party to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship, and (3)
be legally prohibited from marrying each other, thus, a same-sex couple may qualify. See id.
§ 572C-4; cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.017(2)(b) (1997) (providing intestacy rights for unmarried
couples who cohabit for at least 10 years and hold "themselves out as husband and wife" pro-
vided that the couple could have been legally married had they chosen to do so; thus, a same-sex
couple may not qualify).
23See deFuria, supra note 4, at 201 (arguing that "because it is often impossible for
judges or juries to decide [undue influence] cases in a moral vacuum, the doctrine [of undue
influence] often functions instead as a barometer of society's mores"); Leslie, supra note 15, at
236 (reviewing case law and concluding that "many courts are as committed to ensuring that
testators devise their estates in accordance with prevailing normative views as they are to ef-
fectuating testamentary intent.... [Thus, nonconforming wills] typically are upheld only if the
will's proponent can convince the fact-finder that the testator's deviation from normative values
is morally justifiable."); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571,
598 (1997) (concluding that undue influence is a means for the "imposition of societal norms as
to appropriate testamentary behavior").
24See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L. 2039, 2043 (1994) (book review)
[hereinafter Langbein, Will Contests] ("Our fundamental value in the law of wills is freedom of
testation, but the inner tendencies of civil jury trial put our procedural system in conflict with
our substantive law.... because jurors who decide without giving reasons have such latitude to
substitute their wishes for the testator's.").
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norm. These values come into conflict when a trier of fact equates
upholding a nontraditional testamentary gift with endorsing the non-
traditional relationship that influenced the gift.25
Thus, the "abhorrent" testator who disinherits her legal spouse or
close blood relations in favor of, for example, a non-mainstream re-
ligion,26 a radical political organization,27 or a same-sex romantic
partner28 is especially at risk of having her estate plan discarded. This
Article explores a means for overcoming this threat and ensuring
equal testamentary freedom, in fact as well as in principle, for the
"abhorrent" testator.
29
25But see Fellows et al., supra note 20, at 72 n.295 ("When courts address property divi-
sions upon the termination of a relationship, [as by the death of one of the committed partners,]
to a large extent, rather than recognizing the legal status of family units headed by committed
partners, they are protecting individual claimants and not ongoing family units.").26 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Ark. Ct. App.
1987) (commenting that "[w]here the provisions of a will are unjust, unreasonable and unnatu-
ral, doing violence to the natural instinct of the heart, to the dictates of parental affection, to
natural justice, to solemn promises, and to moral duty, such unexplained inequality is entitled to
great influence in considering the question of testamentary capacity and undue influence"). In
Carpenter the court found that a spiritual leader whose "doctrine is somewhat unclear from the
record but appears to have involved delving into the metaphysical in an effort to get closer to
God and included reincarnation, soul mates, and meditation" unduly influenced the testator who
disinherited her minor son. Id. at 503; see also Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207-09 (Wash.
1914) (affirming jury verdict setting aside will on grounds of mental incapacity where will left
estate to "the founder of a peculiar religious sect" and would not have been made "if the testator
had not entertained some peculiar religious belief').
27See, e.g., In re Strittmater, 53 A.2d 205, 206 (NJ. 1947) (finding that testator's "insane
delusions about the male" caused her to disinherit her cousins, with whom she had very little
contact, in favor of the National Women's Party); cf. In re Aramian's Estate, 166 N.Y.S.2d
1006, 1007 (Sun. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (holding that testamentary trust settlor's purpose of
providing scholarships for Americans to study at a Soviet university was "not possible or practi-
cable" because "[t]o permit students to attend that university might result in education with
political indoctrination adverse to good American citizenship").
28See In re Kaufnann's Will, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 683 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), afTd, 205
N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965) (affirming jury's finding of undue influence by testator's long-term
same-sex "best pal" despite testator's explanation in a letter accompanying his will of how his
partner had enriched his life through the years; such letter was "cogent evidence of [the testa-
tor's] complete domination by [his partner]"); see also Sherman, supra note 15, at 227 (arguing
that the trier of fact's discomfort with homosexuality, coupled with the preference under the law
for dispositions to "natural objects of the testator's bounty" over dispositions to "strangers in
blood" can be expected to disadvantage a gay testator who leaves property to his significant
other). 291t is difficult to estimate the frequency with which nonconforming estate plans are dis-
rupted by disgruntled heirs or putative legatees. In assessing the magnitude of the problem, one
must consider the will contest that terminates prior to adjudication. See John H. Langbein, Liv-
ing Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 63, 66 (1978) [hereinafter Lang-
bein, Conservatorship Model] (theorizing that a great many will contests are intended to, and
do, result in a pretrial settlement); Sherman, supra note 15, at 233 n.43 (hypothesizing that the
fact that by 1981 there were relatively few reported cases involving an undue influence chal-
lenge to the will of a gay or lesbian testator might be due to the pressure on the testator's in-




The doctrines of mental capacity and undue influence, the most
popular vehicles for challenging a will, 30 appear particularly condu-
cive to abuse by the trier of fact adjudicating the validity of a noncon-
forming estate plan. These standards are sufficiently nebulous that
they enable the fact-finder to rewrite the testator's estate plan in ac-
cordance with societal norms.31
The danger that a nonconforming testator will have her estate
plan discarded by the trier of fact has been documented over time.
32
One might reasonably hypothesize that demographic changes in the
structure of the typical American family and corresponding shifts in
attitudes toward what constitutes a family33 would have diminished
the problem. Recent will studies appear to confrm, however, that
this danger to the nonconforming testator persists.34
Professor Melanie Leslie recently studied a large number of will
challenges culminating in reported decisions in the years 1985
30See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 607, 647-50 (1987) ("[TIhe predominant weapon for attempting to undo a will is an
allegation of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity.... [TJ]ndue influence and lack
of testamentary capacity accounted for the exclusive grounds of contest in 39 of 60 cases in
which the allegations could be determined.") (footnotes omitted).31See ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 255 ("It is difficult to put a realistic concept of undue
influence into a capsule.... As in case of mental capacity we are dealing largely with subjec-
tive elements."); Langbein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 66 ('The genre [of mental
capacity challenges] is inevitably intensely factitious: the recurrent issue is the condition of the
particular testator as the trier can infer it from evidence of his past conduct and circum-
stances."); Schoenblum, supra note 30, at 649 ('The absence of clear legal principles and the
difficulty of applying such standards to 'idiosyncratic' behavior of the testator may encourage
will contests that ought not to be brought").32See Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990
U. CH. LEGAL F. 529,543,545-46 (noting that a 1938 Minnesota study of undue influence and
mental capacity challenges found that jury verdicts were reversed on appeal in 60% of undue
influence cases and 30% of mental capacity cases as compared to a reversal rate of less than
10% for decisions by trial judges in similar cases); Peter Van Every, Comment, Undue Influ-
ence-Judicial Implementation of Social Policy, 1968 WiS. L. REV. 569, 570, 573 (examining
35 undue influence cases before the Wisconsin Supreme Court between 1945 and 1968 and
concluding that "[a] close blood relationship between the proponent and the testator appears to
make it considerably more difficult to establish undue influence"); Note, Will Contests on Trial,
6 STAN. L. REV. 91, 92 nn.4-5 (1953) (reporting that a study of mental capacity and undue in-
fluence cases in California between 1892 and 1953 found that 77% of the cases reaching the
jury resulted in a verdict for the contestant; in addition, 62% of will contest verdicts for the
contestant that were appealed to the California Supreme Court for insufficiency of the evidence
between 1892 and 1953 resulted in reversal).33See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 20, at 2 nn.l-3 (citing to studies evidencing an in-
creased number of U.S. households with blended families, single parents, and unmarried same-
sex and mixed-sex committed couples).
34 See Leslie, supra note 15, at 236-37 ("[C]ourts faced with an offensive Will often use
other doctrines ostensibly designed to ascertain whether the testator formulated testamentary
intent-doctrines such as capacity, undue influence and fraud-to frustrate the testator's intent
and distribute estate assets to family members."); Schoenblum, supra note 30, at 654, 659 (re-
porting results of his study of will contests in Davidson County, Tennessee, between 1976 and
1984, which found that "[w]hen wills involving bequests and devises to non-relatives and
friends were adjudicated at trial, the outcome was rarely in favor of sustaining the will").
1999]
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through 1989.35 She found that the trier of fact was far more likely to
uphold the testator's estate plan where the will contestant and the
principal will beneficiary were equally related to the testator as com-
pared to cases where the will contestant was related to the testator by
blood or marriage and the principal will beneficiary was a non-
relative.36 In only eighteen of the seventy (25.7%) undue influence
cases involving will contestants and will beneficiaries of equal family
relation to the testator was the will denied probate on the grounds of
undue influence. In comparison, in eighteen of the thirty-six (50%)
undue influence cases in which a will contestant related to the testator
by blood or marriage challenged a devise to a non-relative of the tes-
tator, the will was found to have been procured through undue influ-
ence.37 Thus, the trier of fact was twice as likely to invalidate a will
on grounds of undue influence when the will contest implicated the
cultural norm favoring the legal spouse and close blood relations over
non-relatives.
Professor Leslie concluded that courts utilized a de facto lower
standard of proof in cases of alleged undue influence where a family
member challenged a bequest to a non-family member as compared to
undue influence challenges where both the contestant and the benefi-
ciary were relatives of the testator.38 Moreover, she found that where
a relative contested on grounds of undue influence a gift to a non-
relative, the court was more likely to focus not on whether the devisee
had destroyed the free agency of the testator and replaced the testa-
tor's volition with her own, but on whether the devise to the non-
relative was "just."39
One could, however, attribute these disparate results in undue in-
fluence cases as being the product, not of a pernicious disregard of the
"abhorrent" testator's testamentary freedom, but of the fact-finder's
sensible presumption that most property owners would prefer that
their property pass at their death to close family members rather than
to non-relatives. 4° It is most significant, therefore, that Professor
Leslie also found that courts are more likely to declare a will invalid
for failure to comply with testamentary formalities when the will's
35 Professor Leslie "examined each case noted in ... Westlaw topic number 409 (Wills),
key numbers 154-66 (covering the elements of undue influence and related evidentiary and
procedural issues) for the period between December 31, 1984 and January 1, 1990." Leslie,
supra note 15, at 243 n.41.36See id. at 243-44 ("Courts were much more likely to honor testamentary intent when
the will provided for family members as opposed to non-relatives.").37 See id. at 244 n.42.38See id. at 245 ("[A] significant number of courts confronted with wills that disinherited
family members in favor of non-family members upheld or imposed findings of undue influence
based on minimal evidence, or evidence that would be insufficient to meet the contestant's
burden of proof in a case where the will's primary beneficiaries were non-relatives.").39See id. at 246.40See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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provisions favor non-relatives over family members. 41 This finding is
notable because there does not appear to be any "innocent" explana-
tion for such a finding. It is simply not tenable to argue that testators
who prefer non-relatives to family members are less likely to comply
with the testamentary formalities required for the execution of a
will-principally, that the testator put her will in writing, sign the will
and have the will attested to by witnesses.
Professor Leslie's findings led her to conclude that "It]he axiom
that wills law is designed only to effectuate testamentary intent is
therefore false, and the idea that individuals enjoy complete testa-
mentary freedom is a myth. Generally, individuals have 'freedom' to
distribute theif property along carefully delineated channels in accor-
dance with prevailing norms.' ' 42
Moreover, will substitutes, which pass property at the owner's
death without probate administration, do not provide an adequate safe
harbor for the "abhorrent" property donor. A "pure" will substitute
allows the property owner to retain all of the incidents of ownership
over her property during her life, while also affording her a means to
designate the successor to her property at her death by a mechanism
that keeps the property outside of probate administration.43 The four
principal "pure" will substitutes are life insurance policies, pension
accounts, joint accounts and revocable inter vivos trusts." By com-
parison to the "pure" will substitutes, an "imperfect" will substitute,
such as a joint tenancy, also allows the property owner to pass her
property at death without probate but requires her to give up some
rights of ownership in the property at the creation of the "imperfect"
will substitute.45 The owner of real or personal property who places
the property in a joint tenancy, for example, must irrevocably pass to
her co-tenant at the creation of the joint tenancy a partial interest in
the property.46
The availability of even "pure" will substitutes can not offer suf-
ficient protection to the minority-culture property donor from ma-
joritarian cultural norms. First, will substitutes, other than the revo-
cable inter vivos trust, are inherently asset-specific in that each will
4t See Leslie, supra note 15, at 260; see also id. at 237,259,263-64.42Id. at 273; see also id. at 257-58 ("[R]egardless of what courts declare, the presumption
in favor of family members generally can be overcome only where the court views the testator's
reason for disinheriting relatives as morally acceptable. Thus, courts often focus more on the
character of the disinherited contestant and his or her relationship with the testator than the
quantity of evidence tending to show undue influence. Accordingly, testators who wish to dis-
tribute their property in a way that a court may view immoral, unjust or improper have limited
freedom to do so.") (footnote omitted).
43See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Suc-
cession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (1984) [hereinafter Langbein, 4lonprobate Revolution].
"See id. at 1109.
45See id. at 1114.
4See id
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substitute relates only to a particular type of property.47 Thus, the
property owner who utilizes will substitutes still may need to execute
a will to ensure, as best she can, that none of her property passes ac-
cording to an intestacy scheme that does not comport with her dona-
tive wishes. Second, will substitutes are subject to the same grounds
of attack as are testamentary transfers.48 Moreover, even if will sub-
stitutes could provide an escape for the "abhorrent" testator from
majoritarian limitations on her testamentary freedom, such limitations
would remain troubling. Every competent citizen should have an
equal right to make a will and to have her testamentary wishes therein
respected.49
II. A VOICE AT THE TABLE
A. Culture and the Application of Neutral Law
Some evidence supports the widely held view that juries are even
more likely to upset the testator's nonconforming estate plan than are
judges sitting as finders of fact.50  Courts and commentators alike
have decried the tendency of juries to upset estate plans based solely
on "their own concepts of how testators should have disposed of their
properties., 51 At least one commentator has called for the elimination
of jury trials in will contests because juries are more likely than are
judges to ignore the law and to decide the case based on their own
47See id. at 1115, 1115 n.32; Grayson M.P. McCouch, Will Substitutes Under the Revised
Uniform Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1123, 1149-50 (1993).
48See Sherman, supra note 15, at 264-66 (concluding that a "homosexual settlor must be
as concerned about charges of undue influence as is the homosexual testator").49This is particularly so in light of the fact that the subsidiary rules applicable to wills,
which "are the product of centuries of legal experience in attempting to discern transferors'
wishes and suppress litigation," may not apply to a will substitute. Langbein, Nonprobate
Revolution, supra note 43, at 1134-40. But cf McCouch, supra note 47, at 1149-72 (explicating
the several ways in which the 1990 Uniform Probate Code moves toward unification of the
subsidiary laws of wills and will substitutes).50See Schoenblum, supra note 30, at 626-27 (studying probate records for Davidson
County, Tennessee, for the years 1976-1984 and concluding that juries were more likely to hold
for the will contestant than were judges).
511n re Fritischi's Estate, 384 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1963); see also id. at 659 n.1 ("But the
fact that juries exhibit consistent unconcern for the wishes of testators should come as no sur-
prise. Indeed, the tendency of juries in this respect is so pronounced that it has been said to be a
proper subject of judicial notice."); Langbein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 64-65
(attributing the greater frequency of will contests in the United States, as compared to European
nations, in part, to the fact that many American jurisdictions allow juries to decide issues of
mental capacity and theorizing that a jury may be "more disposed to work equity for the disin-
herited than to obey the directions of an eccentric decedent who is in any event beyond suffer-
ing"); Athanas, supra note 32, at 546 ("Juries tend to decide which party appears most entitled
to the property, not whether the instrument accurately represents the will of the testator. Thus,
juries substitute their own sense of equity in place of the law's recognition that testators may
dispose of their property as they choose.").
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sense of equity.52  This proposed solution falls short, however, be-
cause it leaves the fate of the "abhorrent" testator's estate plan in the
hands of a decision-maker who is likely not to appreciate or respect
the values and beliefs of the "abhorrent" testator. Judges elected by
the greater community as well as judges appointed and confirmed by
officials who are themselves elected by that community are likely to
share the values and biases of the community.53
Cultural understanding, tolerance and acceptance are as impor-
tant as facially-neutral laws in securing equal rights for minorities.
54
True equality requires that neutral law be applied in a culturally neu-
tral fashion.
52See Athanas, supra note 32, at 530-31. Athanas conducts a state-by-state analysis of
the constitutional and statutory rights to ajury trial in will contests. He reports that 13 states do
not use juries in deciding will contests. Further, he concludes that no state has a constitutional
right to jury trial in will contests. See HE. at 541; see also Peter I. Mason & Mark W. Weisbard,
The Pitfalls of Will Contest Litigation, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 499, 521-22 (1983) (explaining
that the right to a jury trial in a will contest in Illinois is statutory only and not mandated by
either the Illinois or U.S Constitutions).
For an argument that the jury in a will contest should not be informed of the dispositive
elements of the will so as to protect testamentary freedom, see Michael Falker, Comment, A
Case Against Admitting into Evidence the Dispositive Elements of a Will Contest Based on
Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CoNN. L. REv. 616 (1970).53Unfortunately, one can not state with confidence that the probate bench is likely to put
aside its biases in ruling on the validity of the nonconforming estate plan. See Langbein, Will
Contests, supra note 24, at 2044 ("There have long been difficulties in staffing the American
probate bench, and some of the people who serve there.., are menacing.... [T]he integrity and
ability of the American probate bench has so often been found wanting that confidence in the
predictability and correctness of adjudication in these courts has been impaired.").
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades: Ex-
ploring the Limits of Law as an Agent of Transformational Social Change, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 423, 440 (1997) ("The substantive content of many rights is culturally dependent; one's
sense ofjustice is necessarily something of a function of one's cultural norms."); Toni M. Mas-
saro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REv. 45, 47-48 (1997) (arguing that "expanding
gay rights requires only reason, tempered and informed by empathy .... [T]he root of most
opposition to gay rights.. .is not legal doctrine per se, but judges' failures to approach matters
involving human sexuality by using available social science research, and their broader failure
to empathize with those whose sexual identity and desires are not exclusively heterosexual.");
Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual
Orientation, 13 HARV. BLAcKLEWrTR J. 65, 68 (1997) ("Dismantling hegemony requires em-
pathy and sympathy, that is, understanding others' perspectives, identifying and breaking down
aspects of society that subordinate different groups and constructing a new society that is ac-
ceptable to all.").55See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 81-89
(1997) (arguing that gay people will be disadvantaged by recognition of a cause of action for
same-sex sexual harassment because "any given sexual comment or behavior will be judged
more harshly by the finder of fact when the claimed victim of the alleged harassment is of the
same sex as the alleged harasser than when he is of the other sex"); see also William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and
Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HoFSTRA L. REv. 817, 952 (1997)
("(]volution of public law is driven by changes in society, culture, and politics. In the larger
time frame, public law is not just the application of 'neutral' principles, but is really a con-
flictual struggle to determine what in the short term will be considered 'neutral' application of
agreed-upon principles and criteria.") (footnote omitted).
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The law of wills, on its face, places no disability on the right of a
member of a cultural minority to devise her property as she sees fit.
Thus, for example, the lesbian who bequeaths her property to her
same-sex life partner stands de jure on equal legal footing with the
wife who leaves her estate to her husband. In fact, however, a chal-
lenge to the former devise is far more likely to succeed as compared
to a contest against the latter estate plan.
56
This distinction in de facto testamentary rights under facially-
neutral law arises from one part ignorance, one part fear and one part
loathing. The trier of fact is likely to view the bequest to a same-sex
partner through a heterosexual mind's eye.57 The trier of fact expects
Professor Eskridge illustrates this point by way of the Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), standard for defining "obscenity." See Eskridge, supra, at 892. Under Miller, the gov-
ernment may ban as obscene material that (1) the "average person, applying contemporary
community standards" finds "appeals to the prurient interest," (2) depicts sexual material "in a
patently offensive" manner, and 3) "taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). Professor Eskridge argues that
"under Miller prosecutors could play on juror revulsion against or ignorance of homoerotic
material to prove violation of community standards and insufficient redeeming social
value .. " Eskridge, supra, at 894. Thus, "an inexorable consequence of the [Miller standard]
was to encourage local crackdowns on gay erotica, which was significantly more likely to vio-
late Miller's 'community standards' test than straight erotica." Id. Similarly, Professor Nadine
Strossen reports that under the Canadian Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Butler v. The Queen
[1992] S.C.R. 452, which held that the government could outlaw materials that subordinate or
degrade women, government censors have focused on lesbian and gay erotica while leaving
mainstream violent and misogynistic heterosexual pornography largely untouched. See NADINE
STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S
RIGHTS 170, 235-39 (1995). For arguments that the Butler test could be applied in a manner
that does not disadvantage gay men or lesbians, see Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Pornog-
raphy After Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium: A Call for Gay Male Cooperation in the
Struggle for Sex Equality, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 22, 61-63, 73 (1997) ("[R]ather than en-
force and implement the equality mandate recently adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in
Butler, Customs' officials continue to judge and define harm according to their personal per-
ceptions of what is morally repugnant and socially undesirable."); Margaret McIntyre, Sex
Panic or False Alarm? The Latest Round in the Feminist Debate over Pornography, 6 UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 189, 238-39 (1995) (conceding that Canadian Customs has implemented Butler
in a homophobic manner but arguing that "the law's definition of subordination and degradation
are inherently vague and that perhaps this vagueness can be clarified [so as to protect gay and
lesbian erotica]").56See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 55, at 947 (describing how Gertrude Stein's blood fam-
ily successfully challenged Stein's will, which bequeathed her estate to her lesbian partner of
forty years, on undue influence grounds).57See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 691, 732 (1997) ("While proof of the [alleged sexual] harasser's heterosexuality is never
required in different-sex cases because it is merely assumed, proof of homosexuality is fre-
quently required in same-sex [sexual harassment] cases in order to demonstrate that the conduct
was undertaken 'because of sex'."). The typical judge or juror is likely to be a non-gay person
who can not directly access the same-sex romantic and affectional experiences of the gay testa-
tor. See generally EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 293 (1994) (reporting that 2.8% of American men
and 1.4% of American women between the ages of 18 and 60 identify themselves as gay or
lesbian). Moreover, one can not assume that the relatively rare gay judge or juror will demon-
strate empathy or respect for the values that informed the gay testator's estate plan. See, e.g.,
TONI A.H. MCNARON, POISONED IVY: LESBIAN AND GAY ACADEMICS CONFRONTING
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to find the norm-a marriage between a man and a woman.58 Instead,
what the trier of fact finds is, quite literally, queer. The trier of fact's
explanation for this testamentary deviancy is likely to be informed by
its assumptions with respect to gay people.59 As Professor Marc Fajer
explains:
Pre-understanding about a particular group can inter-
fere with discourse about that group because many people
believe they "know" important things about members of the
group, things which often are not true about many group
members. The pre-understanding of judges and lawyers can
infect the legal process and build incorrect or overbroad as-
sumptions into the structure of laws and legal decisions.
For example . . .the pre-understanding that lesbians and
gay men live lives in which sexual activity is separate from
love and family is an important part of the majority opinion
in Bowers v. Hardwick, which allowed states to criminalize
same-sex activity.6°
The "pre-understanding" that gay relationships are principally
sexual-a series of hedonistic sexual encounters-and are not compa-
rable to non-gay relationships with respect to romantic, familial or
social attachments and obligations, is at the heart of the threat to any
devise to a same-sex partner.61 The less value the fact-finder places
on a gay relationship the more likely she is to find that some force
other than the testator's affection or sense of obligation-such as
mental incapacity, undue influence or testamentary fraud-motivated
the bequest. This problem is compounded to the extent that the trier
HOMOPHOBIA passim (1997) (reporting numerous narratives of lesbian and gay academics who
have experienced disparate treatment on the basis of their sexual orientation at the hands of
closeted gay faculty colleagues and administrators).58See, e.g., Rush, supra note 54, at 94 ("IT]he heterosexual traditional family is such an
entrenched social, legal, and economic norm that any family that deviates from it typically expe-
riences discrimination.').59See Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Out-
sider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEo. LJ. 1845, 1847 (1994) (explaining that "pre-
understandings"--assumptions that members of the majority culture have with respect to people
who belong to certain "outsider" cultural groups-often influence the outcome of a case).
601d. (citations omitted); see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche To-
gether?: Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay
Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511,513-14,544 (1992) (arguing that the prejudicial effects of"pre-
understanding" may be diffused by relaying the reality of gay people's lives).6 1See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 15, at 290 (calling for a "confront[ation] and explor[ation
of] prejudices that may prevent courts from understanding others' desires to make bequests for
non-traditional reasons"); Massaro, supra note 54, at 108 ("Lawyers and other advocates for gay
rights... can make some progress by supplementing the more abstract, reason-based appeals
for justice with concrete accounts of... the ordinariness and orderliness of many gay and les-
bian existences....").
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of fact also fears, or is offended by, a culture that she finds foreign.62
Therefore, a viable solution to the problem of judicial hostility to the
non-conforming estate plan should take into account the role that val-
ues and beliefs play in the application of the facially-neutral law of
wills.
B. Ante-Mortem Probate
Ante-mortem probate, also known as living probate, is one long-
debated probate reform that allows the testator personally to educate
the fact-finder with respect to the culture that informed her choice to
devise her property as she did. Generally, ante-mortem probate is a
mechanism for judicial determination during the testator's life of the
validity of the testator's will. The principal advantage of ante-
mortem probate is that it allows the court to consider the best evi-
dence of the testator's capacity to execute a will, namely, the testator
herself. 63 Thus, ante-mortem probate affords the testator the opportu-
nity to explain in person to the fact-finder why she devised her estate
as she did and to refute personally any claims that her "unnatural"
disposition of her property was the product of fraud, undue influence
or a deficient mental capacity at the time she executed her will.
64
In the late 1970s, three states, Arkansas, North Dakota and Ohio,
added ante-mortem statutes to their probate codes. 65 Each of these
states enacted a "contest model" of ante-mortem probate6 along the
62See Stanley M. Johanson & Kathleen Ford Bay, Estate Planning for the Client with
AIDS, 52 TEX. B.J. 217, 217 (1989) ("I'T]he will contest has been seen as a means of vindicating
the family's values over homosexual practices that [the family] could neither understand nor
accept.") (citing Kirk Johnson, AIDS Victims' Wills Under Attack, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1987, at
B1).
63See Langbein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 67, 72 (discussing the com-
parative advantage of pre-death probate hearings).
6A related precautionary measure is the afforced execution ceremony in which the tes-
tator creates a record of her mental capacity at the time she executes her will, which record may
be introduced into evidence if the testator's will is challenged after her death. See id. at 68.
Typically, the testator explains the reasons for her dispositions and, specifically, why she is
disinheriting one or more of her heirs apparent. See Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 24, at
2046. The testator's comments may be recorded stenographically or by videotape. See Lang-
bein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 68. Persons long familiar with the testator and,
perhaps, a physician, pay particular attention to the testator's mental state at the time she exe-
cutes her will and memorialize their observations. See Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 24,
at 2046. Although the afforced execution ceremony may be helpful in averting or ultimately
winning the meritless will contest, in reality, the trier of fact remains free to disregard superior
evidence of the testator's capacity if she is sufficiently offended by the testator's testamentary
dispositions. See Langbein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 68 (noting that even with
afforced execution, summary judgment may be hard to obtain if there is sufficient evidence for a
jury to find incompetence or undue influence, and concluding that afforced execution is "not a
wholly adequate solution to the underlying problem").
6SSee ARK. CODE ANN §§ 28-40-201 to -203 (Michie 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 30.1-
08.1-01 to -04 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081-.085 (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
"Professor Langbein coined the phrase "contest model" of ante-mortem probate, in dis-
tinction to the "conservatorship model" of ante-mortem probate that he advocated. See Lang-
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lines proposed by Professor Howard Fink.67 These statutes provide
for notice to the testator's beneficiaries named in the will as well as to
the testator's heirs apparent (the persons who would be the testator's
intestate heirs if she died at that moment), an adversarial proceeding
in which the parties contest the validity of the will, and a declaratory
judgment by the court as to the will's validity.
Although providing the testator with the advantage of allowing
her personally to defend her estate plan, ante-mortem probate also has
considerable disadvantages.68 Professor John H. Langbein argues that
chief among these disadvantages is the fact that while the testator is
alive, her heirs apparent can not be certain that they will survive the
testator to become heirs under the state's intestacy scheme. 69 There-
fore, the heirs apparent must consider carefully whether they wish to
fight an expensive, time-consuming and psychologically draining will
contest knowing full well that it may be many years before a potential
payoff (the testator's death) and that they will not enjoy the fruits of
their litigious labors unless they survive the testator."o Thus, Profes-
sor Langbein theorizes, many wills offered for ante-mortem probate
will go unchallenged by the only persons with standing to challenge
the will in such a proceeding, the heirs apparent, even when solid
grounds exist for challenging the will.
71
To remedy this substantial shortcoming in the "contest model" of
ante-mortem probate, Professor Langbein offers his "conservatorship
model" of ante-mortem probate.72 The "conservatorship model" bor-
rows heavily from existing conservatorship and guardianship proce-
dures for determining the competency of living property owners.73
Professor Langbein proposes that the testator who fears a will contest
after her death file her will with the court that has jurisdiction to adju-
dicate competency in conservatorship and guardianship proceedings
and seek from that court a determination that she possessed the requi-
site capacity at the time she executed her will.74 The court then would
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent all persons, born and unborn,
who might.ultimately be affected by the court's determination as to
whether or not the testator possessed the requisite capacity to execute
bein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 63; see also infra notes 72-79 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Professor Langbein's conservatorship model).
67See Howard Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After
Death?, 37 OHIO ST. LJ. 264 (1976).
6SSee generally Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 1066 (1980) [hereinafter Fellows, Against Living Probate] (arguing against a proposed
extension of living probate systems in American courts).69See Langbein, Conservatorship Model, supra note 29, at 74.70See id. at 74-75.71See id. at 79.72See id. passim.
73See id. at 75-79.
74 See id. at 77.
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her will.75 While such potentially affected parties would retain the
right to contest the will on their own behalf, the guardian ad litem
feature of Professor Langbein's proposal would afford these individu-
als the option of participating in the ante-mortem procedure only as
sources of information for the guardian ad litem who would be
charged with representing their interests.
76
Professor Langbein concedes that his proposal retains a major
drawback of the "contest model" of ante-mortem probate: the testator
who attaches her will to her ante-mortem probate petition publicizes
her estate plan to her heirs apparent during her lifetime.77 This dis-
closure is likely to undermine family harmony to the extent that the
testator's dispositive scheme gives less to one or more family mem-
bers than they had expected to receive.78  Of course, post-mortem
probate, which similarly discloses to the testator's family members
the contents of her will, may also result in family members who are
hurt and disappointed in the testator. With post-mortem probate,
however, the testator is no longer alive; thus, she does not have to
endure the consequences of family disharmony.79
With this "publicity" shortcoming of ante-mortem probate in
mind, Professors Gregory S. Alexander and Albert M. Pearson have
proposed an "administrative model" of ante-mortem probate.80 The
"administrative model" retains Professor Langbein's guardian ad li-
tem feature but is an ex parte proceeding, rather than an adversarial
proceeding, in which the testator's heirs apparent have no right to81
participate. In determining the validity of the will, the trier of fact
relies upon the guardian ad litem, who acts as "a court-appointed spe-
cial master., 82 The administrative model charges the guardian ad li-
tem with the responsibility of interviewing the testator and others who
may provide insight into the testator's competence and with reporting83
to the court on her findings. The court considers the findings of the
75See id. at 78. This group of potentially-affected individuals includes the heirs apparent,
unborn potential heirs, and beneficiaries under any of the testator's prior wills whose potential
interest would be diminished under the instant will. See id.76 See id. at 78.77 See id. at 77.
78See Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-Mortenm
Probate and Procedural Due Process Litnitalions on Succession, 78 MICH. L. REV. 89, 93-94
(1979); see also Fellows, Against Living Probate, supra note 68, at 1073 (delineating the sys-
temic and social difficulties created by a living probate system).7 9See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 78, at 94.
85 5ee id. passini.
81See id. at 112. Professors Alexander and Pearson argue that "[hieirs at law and disap-
pointed legatees need not be given an opportunity to contest [the will] because.., their inter-
ests, being only derivative of the testator's, are bound by the testator's actions [in utilizing ex
parte ante-mortem probate]." Id. at 117. I pick up this point infra. See infra notes 108-33 and
accompanying text (discussing the testator's right to impose arbitration upon a will challenger).82Alexander & Pearson, supra note 78, at 113.
S3See id. at 113-14.
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guardian ad litem and reviews the testator's will in camera before de-
termining the will's validity.84 At no time are the testator's heirs ap-
parent made aware of the testator's estate plan.
8 5
The robust debate over, and enthusiasm for, ante-mortem probate
within the academic community in the late 1970s86 has not translated
into widespread legislative enactment of such statutes.s7 Arkansas, in
1979, was the third and, to date, the last state to add an ante-mortem
option to its probate code. For the "abhorrent" testator, this is just as
well because, unfortunately, no amount of tinkering with the various
ante-mortem proposals can cure the central defect of ante-mortem
probate: a will that the court declares valid in an ante-mortem probate
proceeding may still be the subject of a post-mortem will challenge.
An ante-mortem probate proceeding can not adjudicate an allegation
of fraud or undue influence that does not occur until after the ante-
mortem probate proceeding. Thus, ante-mortem probate can not pre-
clude the testator's heirs from challenging the will on the grounds that
fraud or undue influence occurring after the ante-mortem probate de-
termination prevented the testator from revoking her will and, perhaps
also, from executing a new estate plan.88 Thus, the "abhorrent" tes-
84See id.8
1See id.86See id. at 90 (predicting that "ante-mortem probate is likely to be widely implemented
in some form").
87In 1980, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") appointed a drafting committee on a Uniform Antemortem Probate of Wills Act.
Professor Alexander served as the Reporter for this project Professor Langbein, Professor
Richard Wellman and several practitioners also served on the drafting committee. Professor
Alexander initially prepared two alternative draft versions of a Uniform Act, one adopting Pro-
fessor Langbein's "conservatorship model," the other adopting his own "administrative model."
At its first meeting, the drafting committee discussed at length both draft versions of the Uni-
form Act. Several committee members expressed reservations about whether an ante-mortem
probate procedure was needed at all. The committee failed at its first meeting to choose be-
tween the two draft versions. At the committee's instruction, Professor Alexander made several
modifications in both versions of the Uniform Act, prepared Reporter's comments and submit-
ted a second draft of both versions. At the committee's second meeting, a practicing attorney
from Arkansas, one of three states at the time with an ante-mortem probate statute, stated that
Arkansas' ante-mortem probate statute was little known and little used in his state. Several
other practitioners on the committee expressed doubt that an ante-mortem probate statute was
needed in light of the facts that will contests are so rare and, in the critics' view, other preven-
tive measures, such as an afforced execution ceremony, worked well enough to safeguard
against will contests. Again, the committee adjourned without endorsing either version of the
Uniform Act. Some time later, NCCUSL terminated the project and the committee disbanded.
Professor Alexander believes that the disagreement between himself and Professor Langbein
regarding the optimal ante-mortem probate model prevented the development of any consensus
over the basic idea of ante-mortem probate as a desirable law reform measure. See Letter from
Professor Gregory S. Alexander, Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to E. Gary
Spitko, Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis (May 21,
1998) (on file with author).
"
5See Fellows, Against Living Probate, supra note 68, at 1082-83 (pointing out this short-
coming of ante-mortem probate and concluding that "for all practical purposes, wills may be no
more immune from attack after living probate than before"); see also Latham v. Father Divine,
85 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1949) (holding that an allegation that the Defendants fraudulently pre-
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tator must find another way to try to ensure that her values are con-
sidered and respected in a determination of the validity of her estate
plan.
C. Testator-Compelled Arbitration of Will Challenges
Arbitration provides an alternate, arguably more viable, means
for the testator to have a voice at the table when the validity of her
estate plan is adjudicated. A testator may provide that any challenges
to the meaning or validity of her will shall be adjudicated not by a
judge or jury but rather by an arbitrator selected by the testator and
named in her will.89 Following an arbitration hearing and an award or
vented the testator from revoking her will stated a cause of action for which a constructive trust
may be imposed).
89See Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. 670, 679-80 (1 Pet.) (1828) (holding that a testator may em-
power her executor to decide will construction disputes); American Bd. of Comm'rs of Foreign
Missions v. Ferry, 15 F. 696, 699-700 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883) (holding that a testator may des-
ignate an individual to construe her will); Estate of Phillips, 48 Leg. Int. 232 (10 Pa. County CL
1891) (holding that a testator may designate an individual to decide "all questions of distribution
or construction, arising under his wilr'); Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 373-74 (1886) ("[A]
testator has the power not only to appoint a person or arbitrator to interpret and settle difficulties
among the devisees and legatees growing out of the dispositions made by the will, but [also] he
has the right to make the decision of such arbiter, if made without fraud or corruption, final and
conclusive upon the beneficiaries under the will.").
In almost every jurisdiction, a testator lacks the authority to compel her personal repre-
sentative to hire a specific attorney as attorney for the estate. See, e.g., Highfield v. Bozio, 207
P. 242 (Cal. 1922); In re Caldwell, 80 N.E. 663 (N.Y. 1907); see also Jean Fleming Powers,
Testamentary Designations of Attorneys and Other Employees, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
261,269 (1990) ("The great weight of authority is that a purported appointment of an attorney is
not binding and gives the attorney no beneficial interest in the estate.") (footnotes omitted);
Richard H. Allen, Note, Power to Contractually Appoint "Attorney for the Estate": A Nonexist-
ent Right of a Decedent, 21 J. OF THE LEGAL PROF. 145, 146 (1997) (citing to cases in numerous
states holding that a testator has no right to appoint an attorney for his estate). Louisiana alone
grants to the testator the right to appoint by will a specific attorney for the estate. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2448 (West 1991).
Two related rationales support the majority rule. First, the attorney for the estate does not
in fact perform her duties as the attorney of the estate but instead acts as the attorney for the
personal representative with whom she has an attorney-client relationship. See Allen, supra, at
146-47. Second, should the attorney for the estate fail to live up to her duties as attorney, the
executor may be held liable for those shortcomings. See id. It follows that the executor should
have the freedom to choose the attorney for the estate, with whom she will have an attorney-
client relationship and for whose mistakes she may incur liability. See id.; see also In re Ogier's
Estate, 35 P. 900, 901 (Cal. 1894) ("There is no such office or position known to the law as
'attorney of an estate.' ... [I]f the attorney employed should be derelict in his duty, and should
receive and misappropriate funds of the estate, the executor would be liable therefor to the
legatees under the will. This being so, it would seem to be neither reasonable nor right to hold
that the executor of a will must necessarily accept the services of an attorney selected by the
testator."); Powers, supra, at 264-65 (discussing problems associated with testamentary desig-
nations of employment); cf. In re Estate of Fresia, 390 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (finding that a testamentary designation of a particular real estate agent was advisory
only, due to the fiduciary nature of the relationship). But see Schmelting v. Devroy, 325 N.W.2d
345 (Wis. 1982) (holding that a testator may condition appointment of a personal representative
on the representative's agreement to hire a specific attorney as attorney for the estate).
The twin policies grounding the nearly universal refusal to recognize a testator's right to
appoint the attorney for the estate have no relevance to the issue of whether the testator ought to
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decision by the arbitrator, the probate court, or the court of general
jurisdiction, should enter the judgment and, if need be, order its exe-
cution.
9 0
The use of arbitration as a means of protecting minority rights
may strike some familiar with arbitration as counterintuitive. Indeed,
one group of commentators has theorized that arbitration may actually
imperil the rights of minorities.91 Professor Richard Delgado and his
colleagues point out that arbitration lacks many of the procedural
safeguards that are present in more formal adjudication and that are
designed to reduce the risk of prejudice. Such safeguards include
limitations on the admission of evidence and rigorous appellate re-
view.92
Delgado and his colleagues conclude from their review of social
science research on prejudice that the rules and structure of formal
adjudication tend to suppress bias, whereas informality tends to in-
crease it93 and that the risk of prejudice posed by informal adjudica-
tion is further increased "when the issue to be adjudicated touches a
have the power to appoint a specific arbitrator to hear contests of her will: The will contestant
will not enter into a fiduciary relationship with the arbitrator and will not incur liability for any
negligence or malfeasance on the part of the arbitrator.
"The Uniform Probate Code endorses resolution of will contests through alternative dis-
pute resolution. See UNi. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (1993) (requiring the personal representative
to abide by the terms of an agreement reached by the successors to the estate with respect to
"alter[ing] the interests, shares, or amounts to which they are entitled under the will of the dece-
dent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written contract executed
by all who are affected by its provisions"); Id. § 3-1101 ("A compromise of any controversy as
to admission to probate of any instrument offered for formal probate as the will of a decedent,
the construction, validity, or effect of any governing instrument, the rights or interests in the
estate of the decedent, of any successor, or the administration of the estate, if approved in a
formal proceeding in the Court for that purpose, is binding on all the parties thereto including
those unborn, unascertained or who could not be located."); Id. § 3-1102 (providing that a court
may approve a will contest settlement agreement if, after notice to all interested persons, the
court "finds that the contest or controversy is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement
upon the interests of persons represented by fiduciaries or other representatives is just and rea-
sonable").
91See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (discussing necessary safeguards
against prejudice in alternative dispute resolution).
9 See id. at 1367 n.65. Arbitration awards are subject to review under a "manifest disre-
gard of the law" standard. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930
(2d Cir. 1986); see also Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (stating in dictum that a
court may vacate an arbitration decision that shows "manifest disregard" of substantive law).
See generally Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal
Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27
IND. L. REV. 241 (1993) (discussing the various legal grounds used to vacate commercial arbi-
tration awards). To succeed under the "manifest disregard" of the law standard, the appellant
must show not only that the arbitrator made an obvious error but also that the record demon-
strates that the arbitrator was aware of a clearly governing legal standard and chose to ignore
that standard. See Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.93See Delgado et al., supra note 92, at 1375-91 (detailing theories on the creation and de-
struction of bias in ADR proceedings).
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sensitive or intimate area of life."94 Moreover, arbitration is thought
to de-emphasize substantive law in favor of "equitable" outcomes. 95
This subordination of legal norms arguably opens the door to preju-
diced decision-making.
Arbitration should also be seen, however, as a means to em-
power minorities. Arbitration can empower cultural minorities by
providing a forum for adjudication in which the decision-maker is
selected because she understands and appreciates the minority culture
at issue. Such a decision-maker need not herself be a member of the
minority culture so long as she is empathetic to the values and beliefs
of the parties whose dispute she is adjudicating.
The case of the "abhorrent" testator, for whom the procedural
and substantive protections of formal adjudication offer no safe har-
bor, is illustrative. Very little has been written about testator-
compelled arbitration. What has been written has focused on arbitra-
tion as a means of controlling costs and delay in probate.96 A princi-
pal advantage of arbitration, however, and a virtue that is directly
relevant to the estate planning concerns of the "abhorrent" testator, is
that it permits the parties to a dispute to select a decision-maker with
expertise in the particular subject matter of the dispute:97
While the civil justice system often selects its triers of fact
on the basis that they know little or nothing about the subject
of the dispute, a hallmark of arbitration is the presence of
one or more decisionmnakers [sic] with pertinent knowledge
or experience. The theory is that an individual familiar with
the commercial context of the dispute, including industry
customs and vocabulary, is better suited to dispense justice
than laypersons who might be hampered by their relative
941d. at 1403.
95See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 3-4, 13-14 (1987) ("Compromise, rather than application of substantive principles,
seems the ADR norm..).."); Soia Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
846, 861 (1961) (stating that almost 90% of arbitrators surveyed believed that they were free to
disregard substantive law if doing so would result in a "more just" decision).96See, e.g., Dominic J. Campisi, Alternatives to Litigation in Trust and Probate Pro-
ceedings, 42 ARBITRATION J. 30, 31-32 (1987) (summarizing the results of a survey of probate
judges concerning techniques to minimize delays caused by litigation); Stanard T. Klinefelter &
Sandra P. Gohn, Alternate Dispute Resolution: Its Value to Estate Planners, 22 EST. PLAN. 147,
147, 151 (1995) (describing arbitration as "less-expensive and time-consuming than a court
fight").97See, e.g., Wilfred Feinberg, Maritime Arbitration and the Federal Courts, 5 FORDHAM
INT'L L. 245, 246 (1982) (commenting that maritime arbitration offers the advantage of arbi-
trators who have knowledge of maritime commercial relations that few judges possess).
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lack of business experience and understanding of trade prac-
tices. 98
Thus, arbitration affords the testator the opportunity to select a
decision-maker with relevant expertise. The testator may select an
arbitrator who is familiar with the values and beliefs that influenced
her in drafting her estate plan. In theory, such an arbitrator should be
more appreciative of the actual forces that motivated the drafting of
the estate plan and more respectful of the testator's culture and testa-
mentary choices.99 Such an arbitrator is, presumably, less likely to
discard a testator's estate plan based on ignorance or disapproval.'
IIl. OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS TO TESTATOR-COMPELLED
ARBITRATION
Generally, arbitration results from an agreement between two
parties that they will arbitrate an existing dispute or a dispute that
may arise in the future from a certain transaction or relationship.
Testator-compelled arbitration does not fit this standard concept of
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism mutually and voluntar-
ily selected by the parties. Thus, one should anticipate the argument
that a will contestant should not be held to the testator's selected
means of dispute resolution when the will contestant did not contract
to be so bound.10'
A. Coerced Voluntary Compliance
A first line of defense against this objection to testator-
compelled arbitration would be for the testator to seek "voluntary"
compliance with her direction to arbitrate. The testator who desires
9 8Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 435-36
(1988) (footnote omitted).
99See Jane Byeff Korn, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A Traditional and a
Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 104 (arguing that the decision-maker's perspective may
influence her decision in a case and pointing out that parties to an arbitration who have control
over the choice of an arbitrator have the opportunity to select a decision-maker on the basis of
her lack of bias); William Mason Emnett, Note, Queer Coq/licts: Mediating Parenting Disputes
Within the Gay Community, 86 GEo. LJ. 433, 441 (1997) ("[Mlediation [of gay co-parents'
claims of custody and visitation rights] enables conflict resolution within the common values
shared by the gay community.").
"°°See Stipanowich, supra note 98, at 437 ("Arbitrator expertise should reduce the possi-
bility that the final decision will be arbitrary or ill-informed. Arbitrators with pertinent com-
mercial background and understanding should also be less susceptible to lawyer artifice or emo-
tion.") (footnote omitted); Emnett, supra note 99, at 442 (suggesting that mediation by gay or
gay-friendly mediators of gay family disputes "work[s] from a baseline that gay families are
legitimate and there is no reason they should be treated differently from heterosexual families").
""1See, e.g., Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
("[A] party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute he has not agreed to submit.").
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that any dispute concerning her estate plan be arbitrated can provide
that any person who nevertheless chooses to litigate in court the va-
lidity of her will, in disregard of her express wishes, shall lose her
devise under the will.1°2 Such an "arbitrate-or-else" clause would
function similarly to a standard no-contest clause and would be sub-
ject to the principal limitation of a no-contest clause. That is, a testa-
tor must devise to the potential will contestant an amount of property
that is significant enough to discourage her will challenge. 10 3 A will
contestant to whom the testator has devised little or no property loses
little or nothing under the no-contest clause by challenging the valid-
ity of the will.
A second major limitation of a no-contest clause is that, in a
majority of states, courts will not enforce a no-contest clause if the
contestant brought her challenge in good faith and with probable
cause.' °4 Courts employ this "probable cause" test in an attempt to
balance two competing interests. On the one hand, "[b]ecause no
contest clauses protect estates from costly, time consuming and vexa-
tious litigation; and serve to minimize family bickering concerning
the competence and capacity of the testator, as well as the amounts
bequeathed, they are favored by public policy."'0 5 On the other hand,
no-contest clauses may discourage meritorious will contests and, in
that way, undermine testamentary intent.
°6
This balancing of public policy interests that grounds the "prob-
able cause" test in the case of a no-contest clause is wholly inapposite
with respect to an "arbitrate-or-else" clause. A direction that a lega-
tee shall forfeit her interest should she decline to respect the testator's
wishes with respect to arbitration of will contests should not discour-
age any truly meritorious will contest. Such a contest may still be
brought, albeit in a forum less hostile to the "abhorrent" testator's
testamentary freedom--arbitration. 1 7 Indeed, to the extent that such
102See Campisi, supra note 96, at 31-32; Klinefelter & Gohn, supra note 96, at 151.
103See Sherman, supra note 15, at 249.
1'4See id; see also Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, 432 A.2d 890, 903-04 (NJ. 1981)
(refusing to enforce an in terrorem clause in a will or trust agreement when probable cause to
challenge exists); In Re Estate of Seymour, 600 P.2d 274, 278 (N.M. 1979) (holding that a no-
contest clause can not effectively disinherit a beneficiary who contests in good faith and with
probable cause); In Re Estate of Westfahl, 674 P.2d 21, 25 (Okla. 1983) (same); UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-517, 3-905 (1993) ("A provision in a will purporting to penalize an interested person
for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is unenforceable if
probable cause exists for instituting proceedings.").
'°sEstate of Westfahl, 674 P.2d at 23.
lr'See Estate of Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278; see also MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 10, at
586 (stating "probable cause" test balances interest in barring invalid wills against interest in
deterring frivolous litigation).
107See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.");
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 289 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("An
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a forfeiture clause discourages meritless "strike suits" that seek to
extort a settlement from the estate, public policy should favor en-
forcement of such clauses.
B. The Superior Right of the Testator/Property Owner
Absent voluntary compliance with the testator's arbitration di-
rection by the will contestant, a court should stay the will challenge
pending forced arbitration. The relative weight of the rights at issue
in a will dispute compel this result. The testator's right to dispose of
her property as she sees fit is indisputably superior to the right of an
intestate heir or beneficiary under a prior will to receive the testator's
property at her death. Thus, the testator ought to be able to condition
any distribution of her property on compliance with her reasonable
directions respecting resolution of disputes over her estate.
Quite simply, the testator's superior rights vis-a-vis the heirs or
disappointed legatees stem from the fact that she owns the property in
relationship to which the rights are being asserted. The fact that the
property owner herself retains the right to defeat the expectations of
the heirs-apparent or putative legatees by transferring her property
inter vivos supports the conclusion that her rights are superior to the
rights, if any, that her heirs-apparent or putative legatees might pos-
sess.108 Moreover, state intestacy schemes are principally concerned
with effectuating the decedent property owner's probable intent rather
than with protecting any right that inheres in the status of an heir.'°9
The testator's devising of her property or the property owner's
acquiescence in the descent of her property at death is, in effect, a gift
to her legatees or intestate heirs.' 0 "Reduced to fundamentals, the
state through probate aids individuals in transferring property that is
indisputably theirs to the objects of their generosity at death." ''
Thus, the testator retains the rights of one who is donating her prop-
erty while her legatees and intestate heirs have only the rights of do-
nees until the testator's gift is completed.1 2 The testator's gift is not
completed until her will is accepted for probate or until she is adjudi-
cated to have died intestate.113 The testator's right to pass her prop-
erty at death, therefore, includes the right to direct that arbitration
arbitration agreement is a species of forum-selection clause: without laying down any rules of
decision, it identifies the adjudicator of disputes. A strong argument can be made that such
forum-selection clauses concern procedure rather than substance.").
I08See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 78, at 102.
'09See id. at 108.
"°See id. at 98 ("Inheritance through testate or intestate succession ... is simply a state-
supervised gift. Until the gift is completed, the expectant recipient has no greater property





3See id. at 102-03, 107.
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shall be used to determine whether she died testate and, if so, who her
legatees are. Such a direction is well within the property owner's
right to leave a conditional gift to her legatees or heirs, who otherwise
have no rights in the testator's property.1
4
Thus, the heir's or putative legatee's "rights" in the decedent's
property are wholly derivative of the decedent's right to pass her
property to the persons of her choosing at her death. 5 The heir or
putative legatee has "rights" in the estate only because the decedent
has granted those rights. Hence, the situation of an heir or putative
legatee asserting a claim in the estate of a decedent who has directed
that such claims be submitted to arbitration is somewhat analogous to
that of a party who claims rights arising under an implied contract
containing an arbitration clause. 16  The individual seeking to vindi-
cate her contract rights should be held to the method of vindication
provided for in the contract. In that regard, Schnelting v. Coors Dis-
tributing Co.117 is informative. In Schnelting, the Plaintiff claimed
that his former employer had wrongfully discharged him in contra-
vention of rights arising from the employer's handbook. The court
affirmed dismissal of the employee's claim, finding that the employee
had failed to utilize the discharge appeal procedures set forth in the
employee handbook." 18 The court held that the employee could not
rely on the handbook when it worked to his advantage but repudiate
the handbook when it worked to his disadvantage; if the employee
wished to assert rights arising from the handbook, he must do so in
the manner provided therein. "9
114See Korn, supra note 99, at 90-91 (articulating, but not endorsing, the argument that
arbitration is more acceptable the less important the rights at issue).
115See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 4, at 500 ("The judicially developed
constructional presumptions in the law of wills strongly favor validity, further reflecting the
subsidiary status of the intestate succession scheme.").116See American Bd. of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F. 696, 699-700
(C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883) (reasoning that since parties dealing with each other at arm's length
may agree to be bound by an arbitrator's decision on a contract dispute, a testator disposing of
her property should have the power to designate a person in whom she has confidence to inter-
pret her will); Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 374 (1886) ("Of course, a will is not an agree-
ment between two or more contracting parties, but it is certainly no less binding upon the parties
who take a benefit under it than if they had contracted with the testator for that benefit.").
117729 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
"8See id. at 214-15.
119See id. at 215; see also Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753,
757-58 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (holding that where plaintiff alleges that defendant, through its man-
agement of subsidiary, caused subsidiary to violate terms of subsidiary's agreement with plain-
tiff, an agreement containing an arbitration clause, plaintiff must arbitrate claims against defen-
dant); McBro Planning & Dev. v. Triangle Elec. Constr., 741 F.2d 342 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding
that despite absence of arbitration agreement between plaintiff contractor and defendant con-
struction manager, Plaintiff must arbitrate claims against Defendant where Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs rights arising under a contract between Plaintiff
and site owner, which contract contained an arbitration clause); Hughes Masonry v. Greater
Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 841 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that subcontrac-
tor is equitably estopped from denying construction manager the benefit of arbitration clause in
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The Supreme Court of the United States has implicitly recog-
nized this hierarchy of interests in which the rights of the heir or devi-
see derive from, and are inferior to, the rights of the property owner.
In Hodel v. Irving,120 the Supreme Court held for the first time that the
Constitution protects a property owner's right to devise her property
to the persons of her choosing. 121 The dispute before the Court in
Hodel concerned a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of
1983 ("ILCA") which provided that certain small interests in Native
American lands shall escheat to the Native American tribe at the
death of the property owner.""
Congress enacted the ILCA in response to a problem that Con-
gress itself had created in the nineteenth century when it divided cer-
tain Native American tribal lands into individual allotments to be held
in trust for Native Americans.123 Until 1910, Congress allowed the
allotted lands to pass at the death of the equitable owner only by the
laws of intestate succession of the state or territory where the land
was located. 124 Quite often, a property owner would have multiple
intestate heirs. Thus, ownership of the allotted lands became in-
creasingly fractionalized over time.125 This increasing fractionaliza-
tion made the land difficult to manage and gave rise to economic
waste. 26 In response to the fractionalization problem, Congress en-
acted section 207 of the ILCA which provided:
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or
restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise sub-
jected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent [sic] by intes-
tacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such interest
represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such
tract and has earned its owner less than $100 in the preced-
ing year before it is due to escheat1 27
contract between subcontractor and property owner where subcontractor's tortious interference
claims against the manager are "intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying
contract" between subcontractor and property owner); A.L. Williams & Assocs. v. McMahon,
697 F. Supp. 488, 494 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("[I]t would be manifestly unfair to allow [Plaintiff] to
assert claims arising out of the agreements against non-signatories to the agreements without
allowing those people also to invoke those arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.").
120481 U.S. 704 (1987).
1'2 See id. at 716-18.
12Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207,96 Stat. 2515, 2519
(1983) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1991)).
'23See HodeL 481 U.S. at 706. At the same time, Congress assigned a portion of the Na-
tive American lands for settlement by non-Native Americans. See id.
'
24See id. at 707.
"25See id.
126See id. at 707-08, 712-13.
'
27See 25 U.S.C. § 2206.
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In Hodel, the Supreme Court held that section 207 amounted to a
taking of the landowner's property without just compensation in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment. Both the district court and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had held that a property owner's
heirs had no vested rights in the decedent's property prior to her
death. 128 The heirs did not reassert, before the Supreme Court, that
their own property rights had been taken; rather, they argued that sec-
tion 207 deprived their ancestors of the right to pass property at
death. 129
The Supreme Court found that section 207 was "extraordinary"
in that it virtually abrogated the right of certain property owners to
pass their property at death. 130  After noting that "[i]n one form or
another, the right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-
has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal
times,' ' 131 the Court held that the government had engaged in an un-
constitutional taking when it provided for such a total abrogation of
the right to pass property at death without just compensation.,32
Significantly, the Court made clear that while the Constitution
protects the property owner's right to pass her property at her death,
no similar constitutional protection attaches to the expectations that
an intestate heir might have in one day receiving her ancestor's prop-
'
2 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710; see also Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 1264 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding that Irving's status as an intestate heir conferred "no property right protectible
under the fifth amendment taking clause").
129See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 711. The Court held that the heirs had standing to assert the
rights of their decedent ancestors. See id. Obviously, the decedents could not assert claims on
their own behalf. A federal statute charged the Secretary of the Interior with prosecuting claims
relating to Native American trust property. The Secretary also was charged, however, with
defending the constitutionality of the ILCA. The Court found that under these circumstances,
the heirs were proper parties for asserting the Fifth Amendment claims of the decedent Native
Americans. See id. at 711-12.13 0See Hodel 481 U.S. at 716. The Court's conclusion that section 207 virtually abro-
gated the property owner's right to pass her property at her death betrays a fundamental misun-
derstanding of the utility of will substitutes, such as revocable inter vivos trusts, in effectuating
this purpose.
''Ild, at 716.
132See id. at 717; see also Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 244 (1997) (holding that de-
spite amendments to section 207 that were not considered by the Court in Hodel, section 207
still "severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property" and, thus,
still amounted to a taking without compensation).
The Hodel and Youpee cases themselves illustrate the pervasive nature of cultural bias in
the law. In striking down the ILCA, the Supreme Court did not give weight to tribal property
rights or the right of tribe members to inherit their tribal culture and community land. Rather,
without regard to these minority values, the Court gave effect to the majoritarian norm favoring
individual property rights. See AVIAM SOI'ER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 83-84 (1995)
(noting that the Hodel Court elevated individual property rights over whatever benefits the tribe
might have derived from the ILCA); Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of
Recognition: Soifer on Law, Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 359, 371
(1997) (commenting that in Hodel, the Court "displayed a willingness to sacrifice group claims
to property to the Anglo-American norm of individual private property rights").
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erty. Indeed, the Court made clear that the state may constitutionally
abolish descent by intestacy altogether.'33
C. The Separability of the Testator's Arbitration Direction from
Her Testamentary Scheme
Some commentators have argued that "[t]o apply will provisions
mandating ADR in [the context of an execution, mental capacity, un-
due influence or fraud challenge] would be tautological, using a pro-
vision in a challenged document to validate the document itself. ' ' 34
That is to say, an arbitrator whose authority to adjudicate a will dis-
pute derives from a clause in the will itself should have no authority
to decide a claim that the will is invalid on grounds of improper exe-
cution, lack of mental capacity, undue influence or testamentary
fraud. Such a view would give the arbitrator the sole authority to in-
terpret the will's provisions but not to hear challenges to the will's
validity.
The doctrine of separability, however, commands that the arbi-
trator should have the authority to adjudicate an execution, capacity,
undue influence or fraud claim against the will so long as such a
challenge is not specifically directed against the arbitration provision
in the will.
The separability doctrine is a legal fiction pretending
that when a party alleges it has formed a contract containing
an arbitration clause, that party actually alleges it has formed
two contracts. In addition to the contract really alleged to
have been formed [the container contract], the separability
doctrine pretends that the party also alleges a fictional con-
tract consisting of just the arbitration clause, but no other
terms.
135
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,136
the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act
"'
33See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718 ("Surely it is permissible for the United States to prevent
the owners of such interests from further subdividing them among future heirs upon pain of
escheat. It may be appropriate to minimize further compounding of the problem [of fractional-
ization] by abolishing the descent of such interests by rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the
owners to formally designate a [devisee] to prevent escheat to the Tribe.") (citation omitted); see
also Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974) ("Basically, the right to
receive property by will is a creature of the law, and is not a natural right or one guaranteed or
[constitutionally] protected... !).
134See, e.g., Klinefelter & Gohn, supra note 96, at 151.
1335Stephen j. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 83, 131 (1996).
136388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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("FAA") 137 adopts a separability scheme, in the absence of contrary
direction from the parties to the agreement. In Prima Paint, one party
to a consulting agreement presented the Court with the claim that the
agreement should be rescinded because the other party to the contract
had induced agreement through fraud. The agreement contained a
clause mandating arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to th[e] [a]greement." 138 The issue before the Court
was whether the federal court or an arbitrator should adjudicate the
fraudulent inducement claim.
139
The Court focused on section 4 of the FAA which provides that a
federal court, "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue....
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement." 14° The Court inter-
preted this language to mean that the arbitration clause is severable
from the rest of the contract-meaning that a court shall have the
authority to adjudicate the fraudulent inducement claim only if the
claim is one that the arbitration clause itself, as oposed to the entire
container contract, was induced through fraud.1  "[T]he statutory
language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud
in the inducement of the contract generally." 142 The Court found sup-
port for its conclusion not only in the "plain language" of the FAA,
but also from its purpose that parties to a contract who select arbitra-
tion as the means for resolving their disputes gain the advantage of a
procedure that is "speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in
the courts." 143 The Petitioner in Prima Paint did not allege that the
other party to the agreement had fraudulently induced it to agree to
arbitrate disputes arising from the container agreement; therefore, the
Court held that an arbitrator, and not a federal judge, must decide the
fraudulent inducement claim. 144 Federal courts have applied the sepa-
rability doctrine of Prima Paint to enforce arbitration clauses in the
face of a variety of contract-based challenges to the container con-
tract. 145
1379 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
13 8Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 398.
139See id. at 396-97.
'409 U.S.C. § 4.




'"See id. at 406-07.
145See, e.g., Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 477 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the district court failed to follow Prima Paint "in considering the contract as
a whole to determine the threshold question of whether [a party to the contract containing an
arbitration agreement] may enforce the arbitration agreement"); Lawrence v. Comprehensive
Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the issue of the illegality of
the contract should be decided by the arbitrator where the parties seeking to avoid arbitration
"do not challenge the legality of the arbitration provision itself, but [instead challenge] the le-
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The FAA governs the enforcement of any arbitration "contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 146 This is so regard-
less of whether the action to enforce the arbitration agreement is
brought in state court or federal court.147 The Supreme Court has held
that Congress's use of this peculiar language "involving commerce"
signaled Congress's "intent to exercise [its] commerce power to the
full." 48  Thus, even the most tenuous connection with interstate
commerce will bring an arbitration clause within the scope of the
FAA.149 Although state law generally governs probate matters, it
would seem that a will "evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce" should fall within the scope of the FAA. Therefore, a testator
seeking to take advantage of the FAA's separability doctrine would
be well advised to include in her will at least a token bequest to an
out-of-state individual, corporate or charitable beneficiary or to name
as executor of the estate an out-of-state person or corporate fiduci-
ary-50
The separability doctrine may apply, however, even where a
court finds that the FAA does not cover the arbitration clause at issue.
State arbitration law governs those relatively few arbitration agree-
ments that remain outside the scope of the FAA. Thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia have enacted the Uniform Arbitration
Act ("UAA") to govern arbitration agreements outside the scope of
the FAA.151 Section 2 of the UAA contains a provision paralleling
gality of the entire contract"); Union Mutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of America v. Beneficial Life
Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 528-29 (Ist Cir. 1985) (holding that under Prima Paint, "the arbitration
clause is separable from the contract and is not rescinded by [a party's] attempt to rescind the
entire contract based on mutual mistake and frustration of purpose").
1469 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.").
147See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("In creating a substantive rule
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.') (footnote omitted).
148Allied-Brce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
149See id. at 282 (the fact that, inter alia, the termite-treating materials used in carrying out
a termite protection contract were brought across state lines gave rise to FAA coverage of the
contract).
150Several states prohibit non-residents or out-of-state corporations from serving as ex-
ecutor of an estate. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 10, at 609; see also In re Estate of
Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981) (holding such
restrictions constitutional).
'See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 to 09.43.180 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-1501 to 12-1517 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to 16-108-224 (Michie
1987 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (West 1987 &.Supp.
1996); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1975 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
4301 to 16-4319 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to
7-922 (1990); 710 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-23 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-2-1 to
34-4-2-22 (Michie 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1-.19 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5-401 to 5-422 (1991 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.240 (Banks-
Baldwin 1991 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (West 1980); MD.
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section 4 of the FAA, which the Supreme Court interpreted as pro-
viding for separability.152 Nearly all of the state courts that have ad-
dressed the separability issue under their state's version of the UAA
subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint have cho-
sen to adopt the separability rule articulated in that case: that a party
to an agreement that contains an arbitration clause may not bypass
arbitration by alleging that the container contract was induced by
fraud or suffers from some other fatal flaw. 153
Moreover, courts in several states that have not adopted the
UAA have nevertheless adopted the separability doctrine.1'4 The rea-
CODE ANN., Cms. & JUD. PROc. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
251, §§ 1-19 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-.5035 (West 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (West 1992
& Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-
2601 to 25-2622 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.015-.205 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1
to 44-7-22 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to 1-567.20 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 32-29.2-01 to 32-29.2-20 (1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 §§ 801-818 (1991); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (West 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to 15-48-240 (Law Co-
op. 1977 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (Michie 1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to 29-5-320 (Supp. 1996); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 171.001-.098 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to 78-31a-20 (1996); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to 8.01-581.016
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to 1-36-119 (Michie 1977).
152Section 2 of the UAA provides in relevant part: "On application of a party showing an
agreement [to arbitrate], and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the Court shall order the
parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agree-
ment to arbitrate, the Court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised
and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise the application shall be de-
nied." UNIF. ARBrrRATION ACT § 2(a), 7 U.L.A. 109 (1997).
153See Flower World of Am., Inc. v. Wenzel, 594 P.2d 1015 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Na-
tional Camera, Inc. v. Love, 644 P.2d 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Hansen v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 974 (Idaho 1987); Monical v. NCR Corp., 467 N.E.2d 644 (Il. App.
Ct. 1984); Goebel v. Block & Marble Brand Toys, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991);
Security Constr. Co. v. Maietta, 334 A.2d 133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Quirk v. Data Termi-
nal Sys. Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 1980); Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp.,
331 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1975); Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App. 1996); see also South
Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great Western Coal, Inc., 437 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1993) (finding that
separability doctrine applied unless a party specifically pled that the arbitration clause was
fraudulently induced); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claim of Fraud in Inducement of Contract as
Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Clause Contained in Contract, 11 A.L.R. 4TH 774, 780-84
(1982) (collecting state cases holding "that a claim of fraudulent inducement of a contract con-
taining an arbitration clause is subject to the arbitration clause and should be decided by arbitra-
tion because such a clause is separable from the other provisions of the contract"). But see Atcas
v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 197 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1972) (holding that court may decide
issue of fraud in the inducement if parties do not expresssly establish intent to arbitrate issues of
fraud and one party seeks rescission of the entire agreement); Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin.
Group Leasing Co., 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting separability doctrine);
Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996) (same); City of Blaine v. John Coleman Hayes &
Assoc., 818 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (same). For an excellent description and critique
of the state court opinions that have rejected the separability doctrine, see John Douglas Stiner,
Note, Arbitration: Shaffer v. Jeffery: The Oklahoma Supreme Court Rejects the Separability
Doctrine and Takes a Step Back in the Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses Under Oklahoma
Law, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 243 (1997).
154See Erickson, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673
P.2d 251, 257 (Cal. 1983); Two Sisters, Inc. v. Gosch & Co., 370 A.2d 1020 (Conn. 1976);
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soning of the New York Court of Appeals is typical: "Judicial inter-
vention, based upon a nonseparability contract theory in arbitration
matters prolongs litigation, and defeats ... two of arbitration's pri-
mary virtues, speed and finality." 155
D. The "Culturally Biased" Arbitrator and the "Engagement to
Capitulate" Test
Another concern with allowing the testator to appoint an arbi-
trator who is familiar with the testator's culture to adjudicate the va-
lidity of the testator's will, is that the arbitrator designated by the tes-
tator may be presumed to be biased in favor of the testator and against
any person challenging the will. Professor Stephen Ware has aptly
described the general problem:
[B]ias may be hard to separate from expertise. One of the
oft-touted advantages of arbitration is that the case is heard
by experts. This is a particularly strong advantage in techni-
'cal areas-like medicine-where the facts may be incom-
prehensible to laypeople. Those who can understand the
facts will be found disproportionately among specialists in
the field, i.e., those with a presumed bias. Judicial resistance
to arbitrator bias in these cases may be the equivalent of ju-
dicial resistance to competent decisionmaking.
1 56
Section 10 of the FAA provides that a court may vacate an arbi-
tration award "[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them." 157  The UAA contains a parallel
provision.1 58 Both the FAA and the UAA, however, also contain pro-
visions that direct the court to enforce the arbitrator selection proce-
Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42,47 (N.Y. 1973); see also Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (applying both Pennsylvania and New Jersey
law). But see George Engine Co., Inc. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881 (La.
1977) (rejecting separability doctrine).
"
5 Weinrott, 298 N.E.2d at 47.
15 6Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1021-22 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Mo-
relite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83
(2d Cir. 1984) ("[Plarties agree to arbitrate precisely because they prefer a tribunal with exper-
tise regarding the particular subject matter of their dispute. Familiarity with a discipline often
comes at the expense of complete impartiality.") (citation omitted); Merit Ins. Co., v. Leatherby
Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 678-79 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that parties who select an expert adjudi-
cator trade impartiality for expertise).
1579 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
15See UNIF. ARBIRATION ACT § 12(a)(2) ("Upon application of a party, the court shall
vacate an award where... [t]here was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party.").
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dures agreed to by the parties. t59 Section 5 of the FAA, for example,
provides that "[i]f in the agreement provision be made for a method
of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such
method shall be followed." 16 Moreover, it is settled law that the par-
ties to an arbitration agreement may authorize arbitration by an arbi-
trator who labors under an appearance of bias.16 1 The issue then be-
comes whether the testator alone may authorize arbitration by a bi-
ased arbitrator.
This Article has argued that a property owner's testamentary
freedom should encompass the right to compel unilateral arbitration
of any dispute concerning the validity of her will. This power to di-
rect arbitration derives from the testator's superior rights in her prop-
erty vis-a-vis her heirs and putative legatees who wish to assert a
claim to that property. 62 Nevertheless, public policy should preclude
the testator from unilaterally compelling arbitration before an arbi-
trator who is so biased that the arbitration is unlikely to provide a
meaningful opportunity for the will contestant to present her case and
prevail on the merits. This requisite fairness does not derive, how-
ever, from any rights that inhere in the will contestant. Rather, the
interests of the testator and, indeed, the state, in ensuring that the tes-
tator's true dispositive wishes are given effect require that any chal-
lenge to the testator's putative estate plan be adjudicated in an unbi-
ased forum.
Given this requisite safeguard of an unbiased arbitrator, the next
task is to explicate a principle that would allow for identification of
an arbitrator sufficiently informed of the "abhorrent" testator's mi-
nority culture yet sufficiently neutral to allow for a meaningful will
contest. Settled arbitration law suggests such a principle.
Arguments that an institutional or professional bias on the part of
the arbitrator has tainted the arbitration process have found some fa-
vor in the courts. 163 One of the most important cases addressing this
'"'See 9 U.S.C. § 5; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 3.
'609 U.S.C. § 5. Similarly, section 3 of the UAA provides that "[i]f the arbitration agree-
ment provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method shall be followed." UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 3.
161See, e.g., In Re Astoria Med. Group, 182 N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. 1962) ("It is indisput-
able, as a general proposition, that the parties to an arbitration contract are completely free to
agree upon the identity of the arbitrators and the manner in which they are to be chosen.... In
point of fact, even in cases where the contract expressly designated a single arbitrator who was
employed by one of the parties or intimately connected with him, the courts have refused to
disqualify the arbitrator on the ground of either interest or partiality."); see also Volt Info. Sci-
ences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) ("There is no federal policy favoring
arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.").
162See supra Part III(B).163See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992)
("[F]ailure to explain to plaintiff that the agreement required all potential disputes, including
malpractice disputes [relating to the quality of gynecological care], to be heard only by an arbi-
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issue is Graham v. Scissor Tail, Inc.,164 in which the Supreme Court
of California declared that an arbitration clause contained in what it
found to be a contract of adhesion was unconscionable. 65 The court
vacated an arbitrator's award where the arbitration agreement desig-
nated an arbitrator who "by reason of its status and identity, is pre-
sumptively biased in favor of one party.'
166
In Graham, a musical artist and a concert promoter entered into
several similar contracts for the promotion of an upcoming concert
tour. The contracts contained an arbitration clause that provided for
arbitration of any disputes arising from the contracts before the Inter-
national Executive Board of the American Federation of Musicians
("AFM"). The musician was a member of the AFM; the concert
promoter was not.' 67 The court conceded that California's Arbitration
Act recognized the rights of the parties to submit their dispute to an
arbitrator of their choosing, even if the arbitrator whom the parties
selected "by reason of [a] relationship to a party or some similar fac-
tor, can be expected to adopt something other than a 'neutral' stance
in determining disputes."' 6  Nevertheless, the court agreed with the
promoter that, in light of the fact that the arbitration agreement was
contained in a contract of adhesion, "to allow the [AFM] to sit in
judgment of a dispute arising between one of its members and a con-
tracting nonmember is so inimical to fundamental notions of fairness
as to require nonenforcement [of the arbitration agreement].', 169 This
was so because such an arbitration procedure would deprive the pro-
moter "of any realistic and fair opportunity to prevail in a dispute un-
der [the contract's] terms."'170
The Graham court grounded its reasoning on an earlier New
York case-In Re Cross & Brown Co.171 In that case, the court was
presented with an arbitration agreement between an employee and his
employer which provided that:
trator who was a licensed obstetrician/gynecologist requires us to view the 'bargaining' process
with suspicion."); Moore v. Fragatos, 321 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (finding a
"substantial likelihood that a health care provider's decisions [when the health care provider is
acting as arbitrator in a medical malpractice action,] will be swayed by unconscious subliminal
bias, impossible to detect") (emphasis added).
M 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
65(Generally, contracts of adhesion are enforceable according to their terms. One seeking
to avoid compliance with a contract of adhesion must show that the contract is unconscionable
or its terms are beyond the expectations of the adhering party. See id. at 172-73; see also 8
SAMuEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS, §§ 18.9-
.10 (4th ed. 1998).
166Graham, 623 P.2d at 173.




70 d. at 176.
'71167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
[i]t is further agreed between the respective parties hereto
that any dispute or difference as to any matter in this contract
contained shall be settled by submitting the same to arbitra-
tion to the Board of Directors of the party of the first part
(the employer), whose decision shall be final. 172
In considering whether such an arbitration agreement should be en-
forced, the court began with the pronouncement that:
[a] well-recognized principle of "natural justice" is that a
man may not be a judge in his own cause. Irrespective of
any proof of actual bias or prejudice, the law presumes that a
party to a dispute cannot have that disinterestedness and im-
partiality necessary to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial ca-
pacity regarding that controversy.
173
Applying this principle to the arbitration agreement at hand,
which made the employer the arbitrator of any dispute arising under
the contract of employment, the court found that the arbitration
agreement was in fact "not a contract to arbitrate, but an engagement
to capitulate."1 74 The court ruled that a party to a contract may not
serve as the arbitrator of disputes arising under that contract. "Apart
from outraging public policy, such an agreement is illusory; for while
in form it provides for arbitration, in substance it yields the power to
an adverse party to decide disputes under the contract. ' 75 The court
held, therefore, that the arbitration agreement at issue was void on its
face.176
In Graham, the Supreme Court of California refined and ex-
tended the principle of Cross & Brown Company:
[A] contractual party may not act in the capacity of arbitra-
tor-and a contractual provision which designates him to
serve in that capacity is to be denied enforcement on grounds
of unconscionability. We have also indicated that the same
result would follow, and for the same reasons, when the
designated arbitrator is not the party himself but one whose
interests are so allied with those of the party that, for all








practical purposes, he is subject to the same disabilities
which prevent the party himself from serving. 
177
The Graham court found that the interests of the AFM were so
closely iligned with the interests of the musical artist, whose fights
and obligations against the promoter it was adjudicating, that public
policy would not allow the AFM to sit as arbitrator. The AFM is a
labor union whose primary objective is to advance the interests of its
members with respect to terms and conditions of employment. Such
compensation issues were at the heart of the dispute between the
AFM-member musical artist and the non-member promoter.178
By its very nature, therefore, a labor union addresses dis-
putes concerning compensation arrangements, between its
members and third parties with [its own] interests [being]
identical to those of the affected members; to suppose that it
would do otherwise is to suppose that it would act in a man-
ner inconsistent with its reason for being. 179
Under the rule of Graham, then, public policy would forbid en-
forcement of a testator's arbitration clause where the testator attempts
to appoint an arbitrator whose interests are disproportionately aligned
with the presumed interests of the testator. The most obvious appli-
cation of this rule would be to dismiss any arbitrator with a financial
interest in the validity of the estate plan. Thus, any devisee under the
will or anyone closely aligned with a devisee under the will should
not be allowed to serve as arbitrator of a challenge to the will. In-
deed, courts generally have been unforgiving of financial bias on the
part of an arbitrator.18° For example, the fact that an arbitrator has
failed to disclose to the parties that she "has a substantial interest in a
firm which has done more than trivial business with a party" is
grounds for vacatur under section 10 of the FAA.181
177Graham v. Scissor Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 177 (Cal. 1981).
17See id. at 177-78.1791&
"
180See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 94-95 (RI. 1991) (holding
that party-appointed arbitrator's practice of charging a contingent fee of 10 percent of any award
can be grounds for vacating award).
18'Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968)
(White, J., concurring); see also Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d
157 (8th Cir. 1995) (vacating arbitration award in favor of Merrill Lynch on grounds of "evident
partiality' where arbitrator failed to disclose that his employer had a "substantial" ongoing
business relationship with Merrill Lynch); CODE OF ETHICs FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES, Canon II(A)(1) (prepared jointly by the ABA and the American Arbitration Assoc.
1977) (providing that arbitrator should disclose "[a]ny direct or indirect financial or personal
interest in the outcome of the arbitration").
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That the testator shared a common minority culture with the ar-
bitrator, however, should not alone disqualify the arbitrator from ad-
judicating the will contest. Although such a shared culture can be
expected to give rise to greater understanding between the arbitrator
and the testator, the arbitrator's interest in the dispute might remain
quite attenuated. Such a broad disqualification based on presumed
cultural bias logically extended to other types of disputes would, for
example, suggest that a female arbitrator may not fairly adjudicate a
dispute regarding property division upon dissolution of a marriage or
a female employee's claim of heterosexual sexual harassment. In-
deed, unless one is willing to posit that minority-culture arbitrators
are meaningfully more culturally biased as compared with arbitrators
from the majority culture, such inter-cultural disputes could be fairly
arbitrated, under such a broad disqualification rule, only before panels
on which none or all of the cultural subgroups is represented.
Even if one were to accept the argument that public policy
should forbid enforcement of an arbitration award with respect to a
will where the sole arbitrator was appointed by the testator, there is a
second arbitration scheme that would allow the testator to influence
the composition (and, thus, the values and knowledge) of the adjudi-
cating body and that would appear to be above judicial reproach on
grounds of arbitrator bias. A common arbitration provision provides
that both parties to a contract dispute shall have the right to appoint an
arbitrator to the arbitration panel, and those two party-appointed arbi-
trators shall select a third, "neutral" arbitrator to complete the three-
person arbitration panel. Courts have repeatedly blessed such a "tri-
partite" arbitration scheme in the face of challenges by the losing
party at arbitration that a party-appointed arbitrator showed "evident
partiality." 182 The applicable rule is that "[a]n arbitrator appointed by
a party is a partisan only one step removed from the controversy and
need not be impartial. '1  Moreover, where each party to the dispute
has appointed an arbitrator, one may presume that bias on the part of
182See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753,759-60 (1 lth
Cir. 1993); Merit Ins. Co., v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that
parties who adopt a tripartite arbitration scheme "can ask no more impartiality than inheres in
the method they have chosen"); Tate v. Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n, 265 Cal. Rptr. 440, 445
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Courts have repeatedly upheld agreements for arbitration conducted by
party-chosen, nonneutral arbitrators, particularly when a neutral arbitrator is also involved."); In
Re Astoria Med. Group, 182 N.E.2d 85, 86-87 (N.Y. 1962) (upholding corporate party's ap-
pointment of a member of its board of directors to tripartite arbitration panel against challenge
of bias). But see Edmund E. Garrison, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs., 283 F.
Supp. 771, 772-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that party may not appoint himself arbitrator on
tripartite arbitration panel when the agreement so specifies).
183Lozano v. Maryland Cas. Co., 850 F.2d 1470, 1472 (1 lth Cir. 1988) (rejecting "evident
partiality" challenge to arbitration award of tripartite panel on the grounds that plaintiff-
appointed arbitrator and plaintiffs counsel both invested in a common limited partnership).
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one party-appointed arbitrator will be offset by bias on the part of the
other party-appointed arbitrator.'
4
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 185 is an in-
structive case. The arbitration agreement in Sunkist provided that the
arbitration panel would consist of one arbitrator appointed by each of
the two parties to the dispute with a third arbitrator to be appointed by
the two 1arty-appointed arbitrators-a typical tripartite arbitration
scheme. The plaintiff-appointed arbitrator, subsequent to his ap-
pointment and prior to the arbitration hearing, met to help prepare the
Plaintiffs case with Plaintiff's counsel, consultants and fact wit-
nesses.87 After the arbitration hearing, the arbitration panel, in a two-
to-one decision, entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff.188 The De-
fendant moved to vacate the award under section 10 of the FAA on
the grounds that the plaintiff-appointed arbitrator's pre-hearing con-
tact with the Plaintiffs counsel, experts and witnesses constituted
"evident partiality and prejudicial conduct."'89
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reit-
erated its earlier holding that any conduct on the part of a neutral ar-
bitrator "that creates a 'reasonable appearance of bias' warrants set-
ting aside an arbitration award on the ground of 'evident partial-
ity'.' 190 Nevertheless, the court held that the arbitrator's pre-hearing
conduct in this case did not merit vacatur of the award precisely be-
cause neither party reasonably expected or intended the plaintiff-
appointed arbitrator to be a "neutral." The court found that the arbi-
trator's "conduct [was] not only unobjectionable, but common-
place."' 191 So long as the party-appointed arbitrator "consider[s] the
evidence of record in good faith and with integrity and fairness" he
does not demonstrate evident partiality. 1
92
Thus, the testator who wishes to protect her estate plan from
majoritarian cultural norms through compelled arbitration of any will
""See Tate, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 445 ("[lIt is not necessarily unfair or unconscionable to cre-
ate an effectively neutral Iribunal by building in presumably offsetting biases.").
"I 5 l o F.3d 753 0 Iith Cir. 1993).
'"See N. at 755.
'
7See iM. at 756, 759.
"'See id. at 756.
'




921d. at 760. See also CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES,
Canon VII(A)(I) (prepared jointly by the ABA and the American Arbitration Assoc. 1997)
(providing that party-appointed arbitrators "may be predisposed toward the party who appointed
them but in all other respects are obligated to act in good faith with integrity and fairness"). But
see Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 885, 893
(D. Conn. 1991) (holding that allegation that party-appointed arbitrator met with party that
appointed him prior to his appointment to discuss the merits of that party's defenses and to
examine documentary evidence provided a reasonable basis for finding evident partiality and
arbitrator misconduct).
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dispute before an arbitrator of her choosing has a second option. She
would be prudent to direct that, in the event that a court refuses to
enforce such an arbitration scheme, any dispute concerning her estate
must be settled before a tripartite arbitration panel. The panel could
be composed of one arbitrator appointed by the testator, one arbitrator
chosen by the party challenging the will, and a third arbitrator se-
lected by the two party-appointed arbitrators. Provided that the tes-
tator thoughtfully selects her party-appointed arbitrator, such an arbi-
tration panel can be expected to be sufficiently respectful of the tes-
tator's values and beliefs, such that the danger to the "abhorrent" tes-
tator of having her estate plan discarded should be significantly re-
duced.
IV. CONCLUSION
Traditional adjudication may disadvantage cultural minorities
even when they seek to vindicate legal rights arising under neutral
law. For example, testamentary freedom may be unfairly abridged
when the trier of fact uses doctrines intended to protect testamentary
freedom to redistribute the "abhorrent" testator's probate estate to a
legal spouse or close blood relations in line with the trier of fact's
majoritarian values and choices.
Arbitration provides a means for cultural minorities to opt out of
a legal forum that is often biased against them. Testator-compelled
arbitration can ensure that the nonconforming testator enjoys the same
testamentary freedom as those who conform to majoritarian cultural
norms. An arbitrator selected by a minority-culture testator because
she respects the testator's values and beliefs is more likely to under-
stand and respect the testator's dispositive choices than is the average
trier of fact composed principally or exclusively of persons from the
majority culture.
Unilaterally-compelled arbitration itself raises several issues of
fairness. Principal among these fairness issues is the question of ar-
bitrator bias. However, because the testator owns the property at is-
sue, she ought to enjoy the right to condition succession to that prop-
erty on acceptance of her chosen method of dispute resolution. This
should be so as long as the arbitrator's interests are not so closely
aligned with those of the testator that the arbitration is unlikely to
provide a meaningful opportunity for the will contestant to prevail on
the merits.
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